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Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, 1673 (2006) of 27 April 2006 and 1810 (2008) of 25 April 2008,

Reaffirming that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the need for all Member States to comply fully with their obligations and fulfil their commitments in relation to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,

Reaffirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be misused for proliferation purposes,

Remaining gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non state actors may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Reaffirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,

Reaffirming its decision that none of the obligations in resolution 1540 (2004) shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Noting that international cooperation between States, in accordance with international law, is required to counter the illicit trafficking by non-State actors in

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nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts at national, regional, subregional and international levels, as appropriate, in order to strengthen a global response to the serious challenge and threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,

Emphasizing the need for States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to strengthen export controls, to control access to intangible transfers of technology and to information that could be used for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, to prevent proliferation financing and shipments, and to secure sensitive materials,

Endorsing the work already carried out by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), hereafter the 1540 Committee, in accordance with its programmes of work, including the establishment of the working groups for facilitating implementation of the Programme of Work,

Recognizing States' progress in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), *while noting* that States have taken fewer measures in some of its areas,

Endorsing also the valuable activities of the 1540 Committee with relevant international regional and subregional organizations,

Taking note of international efforts towards full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including on preventing the financing of proliferation-related activities, and *taking into consideration* the guidance of the framework of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),

Noting that not all States have presented to the 1540 Committee their national reports on implementation of resolution 1540 (2004),

Further noting that the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States, including the adoption of national laws and measures to ensure implementation of these laws, is a long-term task that will require continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels,

Recognizing, in that regard, the importance of dialogue between the 1540 Committee and Member States and stressing that direct contact is an effective means of such dialogue,

Recognizing that many States continue to require assistance in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), *emphasizing* the importance of providing States, in response to their requests, with effective assistance that meets their needs, and *welcoming* the coordinating and facilitating role of the 1540 Committee in this regard,

Stressing, in that regard, the need of enhanced assistance and collaboration among States, between the 1540 Committee and States, and between the 1540 Committee and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations in assisting States to implement resolution 1540 (2004),

Recognizing the importance of progress towards achieving the goals and objectives of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit as a contribution to the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004),

Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress acts of nuclear terrorism including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions, and through appropriate measures to reinforce the existing legal framework with a view to ensure that those committing offences of nuclear terrorism are effectively held accountable,

Endorsing the 2009 comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 and *taking note* of the findings and recommendations contained in its final document,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

1. *Reiterates* its decisions in and the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004), and *re-emphasizes* the importance for all States to implement fully that resolution;

2. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee for a period of 10 years until 25 April 2021;

3. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee will conduct a comprehensive review on the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), both after five years and prior to the renewal of its mandate, including, if necessary, recommendations on adjustments to the mandate, and will submit to the Security Council a report on the conclusions of those reviews, and *decides* that, accordingly, the first review should be held before December 2016;

4. *Again decides* that the 1540 Committee should submit an annual Programme of Work to the Security Council before the end of each May, and *decides* that next Programme of Work will be prepared before May 31, 2011;

5. *Decides* to continue to provide the 1540 Committee with the assistance of experts, and to this end:

(a) *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish, in consultation with the 1540 Committee, a group of up to eight experts ("group of experts"), acting under the direction and purview of the Committee, composed of individuals with the appropriate experience and knowledge to provide the Committee with expertise, to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate under resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and this resolution, including through facilitation of assistance to improve implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

(b) *Requests*, in that regard, the 1540 Committee to consider recommendations for the Committee and the group of experts on expertise requirements, broad geographic representation, working methods, modalities, and structure, including consideration of the feasibility of a coordination and leadership position of the group of experts, and to present these recommendations to the Security Council no later than August 31, 2011;

Implementation

6. *Again calls upon* all States that have not yet presented a first report on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement resolution 1540 (2004) to submit such a report to the Committee without delay;

7. *Again encourages* all States that have submitted such reports to provide, when appropriate or upon the request of the 1540 Committee, additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including, voluntarily, on States' effective practices;

8. *Encourages* all States to prepare on a voluntary basis national implementation action plans, with the assistance of the 1540 Committee as appropriate, mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key provisions of resolution 1540 (2004), and to submit those plans to the 1540 Committee;

9. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee shall continue to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004), through its Programme of Work, which includes the compilation and general examination of information on the status of States' implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) as well as States' efforts at outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation; and which addresses in particular all aspects of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of that resolution, which encompasses (a) accountability, (b) physical protection, (c) border controls and law enforcement efforts and (d) national export and trans-shipment controls including controls on providing funds and services such as financing to such exports and trans-shipments; and includes, as necessary, specific priorities for its work, taking into account its annual review on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), prepared with the assistance of the group of experts before the end of each December;

10. *Urges* the 1540 Committee to continue to engage actively with States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to promote the sharing of experience, lessons learned and effective practices, in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004), drawing in particular on information provided by States as well as examples of successful assistance, and to liaise on the availability of programmes which might facilitate the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), while bearing in mind that customized assistance is useful for the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at national levels;

11. *Encourages*, in that regard, the 1540 Committee, with the support of necessary relevant expertise, to actively engage in dialogue with States on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including through visits to States at their invitation;

12. *Requests* the 1540 Committee, with the support of the group of experts, to identify effective practices, templates and guidance, with a view to develop a compilation, as well as to consider preparing a technical reference guide about resolution 1540 (2004), to be used by States on a voluntary basis in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), and in that regard, *encourages* the 1540 Committee, at its discretion, to draw also on relevant expertise, including, civil society and the private sector, with, as appropriate, their State's consent;

Assistance

13. *Encourages* States that have requests for assistance to convey them to the 1540 Committee, and *encourages* them to make use of the Committee's assistance template to that effect;

14. *Urges* States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to inform the Committee as appropriate of areas in which they are able to provide assistance; and *calls upon* States and such organizations, if they have not done so previously, to provide the 1540 Committee with a point of contact for assistance by August 31, 2011;

15. *Urges* the 1540 Committee to continue strengthening the Committee's role in facilitating technical assistance for implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), in particular by engaging actively, with the support of the group of experts, in matching offers and requests for assistance, through such means as visits to States, at the invitation of the State concerned, assistance templates, action plans or other information submitted to the 1540 Committee;

16. *Supports* the continued efforts of the 1540 Committee to secure a coordinated and transparent assistance process that provides timely and ready availability of information for States seeking assistance and for States prepared to provide assistance;

17. *Encourages* meetings on assistance issues with the participation of the 1540 Committee, between States prepared to offer assistance, States requesting assistance, other interested States, and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations;

Cooperation with International, Regional, and Subregional Organizations

18. *Calls upon* relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to designate and provide the 1540 Committee by 31 August 2011 with a point of contact or coordinator for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004); and *encourages* them to enhance cooperation and information sharing with the 1540 Committee on technical assistance and all other issues of relevance for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

19. *Reiterates* the need to continue to enhance ongoing cooperation among the 1540 Committee, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information sharing, coordination on visits to States, within their respective mandates, technical assistance and other issues of relevance to all three committees; and expressing its intention to provide guidance to the committees on areas of common interest in order to better coordinate their efforts;

Transparency and Outreach

20. *Requests* the 1540 Committee to continue to institute transparency measures and activities, inter alia by making fullest possible use of the Committee's website, and *urges* the Committee to conduct, with the participation of the group of

experts, regular meetings open to all Member States on the Committee's and group's activities related to the aforementioned objectives;

21. *Requests* the 1540 Committee to continue to organize and participate in outreach events on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at the international, regional, subregional, and, as appropriate, national level, and promote the refinement of these outreach efforts to focus on specific thematic and regional issues related to implementation;

Administration and Resources

22. *Recognizes* that implementation of the mandate of the 1540 Committee requires sustained support and adequate resources; and to that end:

(a) *Endorses* the existing administrative and logistics support to the 1540 Committee from the Office for Disarmament Affairs, and decides that the Committee should report to the Council by January 2012 on the possibility of strengthening this support, including through strengthening of ODA's regional capacity to support the implementation of the resolution at regional, subregional and national levels;

(b) *Calls upon* the Secretariat to provide and maintain sufficient expertise to support activities of the 1540 Committee as outlined in the present resolution;

(c) *Encourages* States that are able to do so to provide resources to the Office of Disarmament Affairs to assist States in implementing their 1540 obligations, and to make available "in kind" contributions or cost-free training and expertise to the 1540 Committee to help the group of experts meet requests for assistance in a timely and effective manner;

(d) *Invites* the 1540 Committee to consider developing, in close cooperation with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and other United Nations bodies, ways to utilize and maintain expertise, including, in particular, of former experts of the group, that could be made available for specific missions and assistance needs regarding the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

(e) *Urges* the 1540 Committee to continue to encourage and take full advantage of voluntary financial contributions to assist States in identifying and addressing their needs for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and *requests* the 1540 Committee at its discretion, to promote the efficient and effective use of the existing funding mechanisms within the UN system;

23. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Thirteenth semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

I. Background

1. The present report is my thirteenth semi-annual report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). It reviews and assesses progress made in the implementation of the resolution since my previous report, dated 18 October 2010 (S/2010/538). It underlines the lack of progress on key provisions of the resolution, and highlights concerns that continue to impede efforts to strengthen Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, which stand at the heart of the resolution.

2. Political tension in Lebanon increased markedly during the reporting period fuelled, inter alia, by speculation and public pronouncements concerning the proceedings of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The differences between political camps brought about the suspension of Cabinet meetings for five weeks, from 10 November until 15 December. On that day, the Cabinet meeting ended in a stalemate, leading to institutional paralysis. Against that backdrop, Saudi Arabia and the Syrian Arab Republic jointly deployed efforts to address the growing crisis.

3. On 12 January, the resignation of 10 Cabinet ministers from the opposition, along with 1 minister from President Michel Sleiman's bloc forced the collapse of the Government of National Unity. On 13 January, President Sleiman accepted the resignation of the ministers, but requested that the Government continue to function in a caretaker capacity. The collapse of the Government led to an increase in political tensions in the country. This culminated in a series of demonstrations in support of the caretaker Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, on 24 and 25 January, involving incidents of vandalism. The demonstrations ended as Prime Minister Hariri called for calm and reiterated his movement's adherence to the principles of democracy.

4. On 17 January, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, submitted a confidential indictment and supporting materials for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri to the Pre-Trial Judge, Daniel Fransen. On the same day, I reiterated my call on all parties to refrain from attempts to interfere in or influence the work of the Special Tribunal, underlining that the independent judicial process should not be linked with any political debate and that no one should prejudge its outcome.

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5. On 19 January, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia publicly announced the end of the Syrian-Saudi efforts to address the Lebanese political crisis. Two days earlier, Qatar and Turkey had launched a new mediation effort to solve the crisis; that effort reached a dead end on 20 January.

6. On 25 January, and following two days of constitutionally mandated consultations with all parliamentary groups, President Sleiman requested Najib Miqati to form a new Government. To date, Mr. Miqati's consultations are ongoing. Since he was tasked to form a Government, he has placed great emphasis on reaching out to all parties in Lebanon.

7. On 14 February, a political rally took place in Beirut to commemorate the sixth anniversary of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others. On this occasion, I issued a statement in which I reaffirmed the commitment of the United Nations to the efforts of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to uncover the truth so as to bring those responsible to justice and send a message that impunity would not be tolerated.

8. On 27 February, the 14 March coalition announced that it would not take part in the future Government, and that its opposition platform would be based on support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and rejection of Hizbullah's arms.

9. On 13 March, the 14 March coalition held a major political rally to commemorate the sixth anniversary of its formation. All speakers at the rally expressed strong support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and denounced the continued possession by Hizbullah of arms outside the control of the State and their use as a political instrument in the domestic arena.

10. Over the reporting period, the political polarization between the two main camps in Lebanon has deepened significantly, as demonstrated by a series of sharp statements and the delay in the formation of a new Government. In addition, a series of demonstrations took place calling for the abolishment of the confessional governing system in the country, in the shadow of momentous events elsewhere in the region.

II. Implementation of resolution 1559 (2004)

11. I recall with satisfaction that since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1559 on 2 September 2004, several of its provisions have been implemented. Presidential and parliamentary elections took place in a free and fair manner. The Syrian Arab Republic withdrew its troops and military assets from Lebanon in April 2005. Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic established full diplomatic relations in 2009.

12. However, the delineation of Syrian-Lebanese border, which was strongly encouraged by the Security Council in its resolution 1680 (2006), has not yet taken place. More importantly, the existence and activities of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia continue to pose a threat to the stability of the country and the region, and highlight the need for the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces to exercise a monopoly on the use of force throughout Lebanon. More efforts need to be deployed to achieve the full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) and to maintain the achievements already accomplished.

13. During the reporting period, my representatives and I have remained in regular contact with all parties in Lebanon, as well as with relevant regional and international leaders. I met Prime Minister Hariri in New York on 9 January.

14. Over the last six months, there has been no tangible progress towards the implementation of the remaining provisions of the resolution, in particular in the context of domestic political tensions.

A. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon

15. The objective of resolution 1559 (2004) is to strengthen the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of its Government consistent with the Taif Accord of 1989, to which all the political parties in Lebanon have committed themselves. This goal has remained the highest priority of my efforts to facilitate the implementation of all resolutions pertaining to Lebanon.

16. In its resolution 1680 (2006), the Security Council strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request by the Government of Lebanon to delineate their common border. In that context, I have maintained my efforts to encourage the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon to achieve the full delineation of their common border. The delineation and demarcation of Lebanon's boundaries are an essential element in guaranteeing the country's territorial integrity. It is also a critical element in allowing for proper border control. Despite the commitments of the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon reflected in the outcome of several summit meetings between President Assad and President Sleiman, since August 2008, no progress was registered over the reporting period on this critical issue. The joint Lebanese-Syrian border committee that is tasked with this matter has not yet convened. So far, only Lebanon has designated its participants to the committee. Over the reporting period, there have been no discussions or contacts between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic on the delineation of their common border. While acknowledging the bilateral nature of border delineation, progress on this matter remains an obligation of the two countries under Security Council resolution 1680 (2006), derived from resolution 1559 (2004).

17. The Israel Defense Forces continues to occupy the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, in violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). On 17 November 2010, the Israeli Cabinet decided to accept, in principle, the United Nations proposal for a withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the northern part of the village and its redeployment south of the Blue Line. My representatives and I have since engaged closely with both parties in the implementation of the proposal, as detailed in my last report to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2011/91). Further, efforts in relation to the issue of the Shab'a Farms area have not recorded any progress, as I have still not received any responses from either the Syrian Arab Republic or Israel regarding the provisional definition of the area contained in my report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), dated 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641).

18. Israeli overflights of Lebanese territory continued during the reporting period, on an almost daily basis, including an increased number of fighter jets. This intense regime of aerial surveillance violates resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006), and Lebanese sovereignty. It also increases tensions. The Government of Lebanon has repeatedly protested those violations. I have deplored the violations and demanded that they cease immediately. Israeli authorities claim in turn that the overflights are carried out for security reasons, citing alleged breaches to the arms embargo enforced pursuant to resolution 1701 (2006).

B. Extension of Government control over all Lebanese territory

19. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces play a crucial role in strengthening Lebanon's sovereignty and control over the entire country. The outgoing Government of Lebanon had reaffirmed to the United Nations its intention to extend the State's authority over all Lebanese territory, so that it is eventually the sole armed force in the country, as called for in resolution 1559 (2004) and the 1989 Taif Accord.

20. As I have reported elsewhere to the Security Council in greater detail, in several incidents during the reporting period, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was denied freedom of movement within its area of operations, which endangered the safety and security of the United Nations peacekeepers. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL and the security and safety of its personnel are integral to the effective execution of the Force's mandate. The primary responsibility for ensuring the freedom of movement to UNIFIL in its area of operations lies with the Lebanese authorities.

21. I am concerned by repeated security incidents involving the use of weapons and explosives in populated areas during the reporting period, as manifested most recently in the explosion of a device containing 2 kilograms of TNT inside a church in Zahle. These occurrences confirm yet again the possession of lethal weapons by non-State actors. They also demonstrate a complete disregard for the safety of Lebanon's civilian population, Lebanese law and for the authority of the Lebanese Government by armed groups. More needs to be done by the Lebanese authorities to impose law and order throughout the country.

22. Security sources in Lebanon have continued to report shootings and explosions in and around paramilitary infrastructures in the eastern Beka'a Valley belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and Fatah al-Intifadah, confirming that paramilitary training occurs in those facilities. The permanent presence of such bases along the Syrian-Lebanese border adds to the general porosity of parts of the land border and poses a challenge for the control of the border by the Lebanese Security Forces. It also makes the border delineation more difficult.

23. The continued existence and activities of militias in Lebanon require improving the management and control of Lebanon's land borders to prevent the unauthorized flows of people and weapons as well as commercial smuggling. Member States have continued to express concern over the illegal transfer of weapons across Lebanon's land borders, in violation of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). Government officials in Lebanon have acknowledged the porous nature of the border and the possibility that arms smuggling has occurred during the

past three years, and have taken limited steps to confront the issue. However, the Government of Lebanon still lacks a systematic approach to border management and made no progress towards the extension of the Common Border Force along the entire border with the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period, owing, in particular, to Government deadlock and the absence of a budget. Information provided by Member States of illegal transfers of weapons continues to mount. I also took careful note of recent reports and allegations of an illegal flow of weapons from Lebanon bound to the Syrian Arab Republic. I take all these reports very seriously, but the United Nations does not have the means to verify them independently.

24. While the work of the Common Border Force along the Syrian-Lebanese border is commendable, current efforts need to be increased and become more systematic, to ensure a strict control along the border. Also, the effective management of the border would benefit greatly from increased cooperation between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic in addition to the delineation of their common border. It is an obligation under Security Council resolutions that all States take the measures necessary to prevent the transfer of arms to groups outside the control of the Government of Lebanon. This is a factor key to stability in Lebanon and the region.

C. Disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias

25. In its resolution 1559 (2004), the Security Council calls for the disbanding and disarming of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. This key remaining provision of the resolution is yet to be implemented. It merely reflects and reaffirms a decision to which all Lebanese committed themselves under the Taif Accord in 1989, in the aftermath of the civil war. At the time, the understanding led Lebanese militias, with the exception of Hizbullah, to give up their weapons.

26. Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias continue to operate in the country outside of the Government's control, in serious violation of resolution 1559 (2004). While several groups across the political spectrum in Lebanon possess weapons outside Government control, the armed component of Hizbullah is the most significant and most heavily armed Lebanese militia in the country. In addition, a series of Palestinian armed groups are operating in the country within and outside the refugee camps.

27. Regrettably, during the reporting period, there was no tangible progress towards the disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias as called for in the Taif Accord and resolution 1559 (2004), although caretaker Prime Minister Hariri and other members of his coalition have succeeded in bringing the issue back at the centre of the political debate in Lebanon. The continued existence of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias undermines the rights of every Lebanese citizen to live without fear of physical harm and also undermines the consolidation of Lebanon as a democratic State and the stability of the country and the region. It is also incompatible with the objective of strengthening Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence.

28. In spite of the endorsement by all Lebanese parties of the Taif Accord, which is enshrined in the Lebanese Constitution, and which every Lebanese Government has committed to implement since 1989, and in spite of the provisions of resolution

1559 (2004), Hizbullah acknowledges that it maintains a substantial paramilitary capacity that remains distinct from the Lebanese Armed Forces. Hizbullah claims that its arsenal, which is separate from that of the Lebanese State, is for defensive purposes against Israel.

29. During the early hours of 18 January, a few thousand unarmed men organized in groups, reportedly militants of Hizbullah, deployed in various parts of Beirut and other cities. The deployment was widely regarded in Lebanon as a show of strength and an implied threat by Hizbullah on the day that the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon had transmitted to the Pre-Trial Judge of the Special Tribunal an indictment in the case of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and 22 others in 2005. The deployment took place a few days ahead of the start of consultations by the Lebanese President with all the parliamentary groups for the designation of a new Prime Minister. The Lebanese Army eventually deployed personnel in several locations of Beirut, citing the need to reassure citizens.

30. In several public pronouncements during the reporting period, senior officials of Hizbullah not only acknowledged maintaining a considerable arsenal but also affirmed that it was seeking to upgrade it. As recently as 19 March 2011, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah stated publicly that his party would continue to arm itself for what he termed defensive purposes. The United Nations is not in a position to verify independently the assertions that are made, but takes them very seriously.

31. Over the last six months, Hizbullah's maintenance of a substantial arsenal outside of Government control has become a central issue of disagreement in the public debate, as many Lebanese see the continued existence of such arms as an implicit threat for use within Lebanon, bearing in mind the events of May 2008. After several years of subscribing to a tenuous national consensus on the legitimacy of the arms of Hizbullah, the 14 March coalition leaders have returned to singling out Hizbullah's weapons as the main bone of contention in the country. On 10 March, the coalition launched its new political manifesto with a meeting at the Bristol Hotel in Beirut under the slogan "the people are stronger than arms". Moreover, in a major political rally to mark the sixth anniversary of the formation of the 14 March Alliance, all the 14 March leaders denounced the possession by Hizbullah of paramilitary capacities outside Government control and its adverse effect on the political arena and domestic peace. Outgoing Prime Minister Hariri held another similar rally in Tripoli on 17 March, where he deplored what he termed the hegemony of the weapons of Hizbullah.

32. On 16 February, on the occasion of Martyr Day, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah delivered a defiant speech, in which he stated that the 14 March campaign against the party's arms was futile and would not lead anywhere. In a more recent public pronouncement on 19 March, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah rejected what he deemed a campaign of incitement against his movement.

33. I recall that the National Dialogue, whose main mandate is to develop a national defence strategy that would address the critical issue of weapons outside the control of the State, had reconvened after the May 2008 events, during which Hizbullah and other armed groups engaged in heavy clashes in many regions throughout the country, resulting in the loss of life, injuries, damage to property and general instability. The objective of this mechanism is consistent with my firm conviction that the disarmament of Hizbullah and other militias can best be achieved through a Lebanese-led political process.

34. Since 2008, the National Dialogue has failed to form the hoped-for consensus among Lebanese leaders which would contribute to the maintenance of domestic stability. Most importantly, it has fallen short of expectations in terms of the development of a national defence strategy. Deliberations at the most recent sessions reflected the strong opposition by Hizbullah and its political allies to discussing the issue of the party's weapons. In addition, for the first time since the 8 March group was established, all the representatives of the group — with the exception of the Speaker of the Parliament, Nabih Berri, who attended in his institutional capacity and not as President of the Amal movement — boycotted the last session called for by President Sleiman on 4 November 2010. The National Dialogue has not reconvened since, in the context of growing tensions between the two main political alliances, thereby leaving this sensitive matter unaddressed.

35. With respect to the situation of Palestinians in Lebanon, I am pleased to report that, pursuant to the adoption in August 2010 by Lebanon's Parliament of amendments to the Labour Code and the Social Security Law, that lifted some of the restrictions on work for Palestinian refugees in the country, the Lebanese caretaker Minister of Labour, Boutros Harb, signed on 22 February an administrative decree regulating the implementation of those amendments. This represents an important and positive step that, once fully implemented, will contribute to improving the living conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

36. In this context, I am glad to report that the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization has reiterated its call upon all Palestinians in Lebanon to respect the sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon and adhere to Lebanese law and security requirements.

37. The presence of Palestinian armed groups outside the camps continues to challenge the ability of Lebanon to exercise full sovereignty over its territory. I have called upon the Government of Lebanon to dismantle the Damascus-headquartered PFLP-GC and Fatah Al-Intifada military bases in the country, and on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with those efforts. Regrettably, there has been no progress during the reporting period towards the disarming of such groups, as called for and agreed upon by Lebanese leaders at the National Dialogue session of 2006 and reaffirmed in subsequent sessions of the National Dialogue since 2008.

38. The situation in most of the 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon has remained relatively stable, although a few shooting incidents and explosions have been registered in some of the camps, in particular in Ain al-Hilweh, where, as recently as 31 March, clashes erupted between rival groups inside the camp. The threat of internal violence that could potentially spill over into surrounding areas still exists in a number of camps, as some of them continue to provide safe haven for those who seek to escape the authority of the State.

39. Notwithstanding those incidents, Lebanese authorities have acknowledged the existence of good cooperation between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Palestinian security officials in the camps. However, Lebanese authorities do not maintain a permanent presence inside the camps, despite the fact that the Cairo agreement of 1969 — which permitted the presence of Palestinian armed forces in the refugee camps — was annulled by the Lebanese Parliament in 1987. More will need to be done to contain potential tension in the camps.

40. The situation of Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon remains, by and large, dire. The United Nations continues to urge the Lebanese authorities to improve the conditions in which Palestinian refugees live in Lebanon, without prejudice to the eventual resolution of the Palestinian refugee question in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement in the region, in particular given the detrimental effects of dismal living conditions on the wider security situation.

III. Observations

41. To my deep regret, owing to the political crisis and institutional paralysis in Lebanon, there has been no progress towards the implementation of the remaining provisions of resolution 1559 (2004), since my last report to the Security Council. Events during the reporting period suggest deterioration in the situation in Lebanon. I am profoundly concerned by the increased tension in the country generated, inter alia, by speculation over the proceedings of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The positions in favour and against the special Tribunal are becoming growingly entrenched and are polarizing the country. In addition, the widespread proliferation of weapons outside of the State's control, combined with the continued existence of heavily armed militias, are ominous for domestic peace and the prosperity of Lebanon. Preserving the stability of Lebanon and ensuring an end to impunity there is essential, if only because the Lebanese themselves have the right to both.

42. Given the confessional structure of Lebanon, the search for consensus is critical to maintain domestic stability in the country. It is therefore imperative that the spirit of entente and respect for the principles of coexistence and security prevail, without intimidation. The political leaders of the country must focus on strengthening the sovereignty and independence of their country and its institutions, a process that must ultimately result in the complete disarmament of all militias in Lebanon. I urge all political leaders to transcend sectarian and individual interests and genuinely promote the future and the interests of the State. At the same time, this should not detract from the full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) and all other Security Council resolutions pertaining to Lebanon, which remain the best guarantee for Lebanon's long-term prosperity and stability as a democratic State.

43. I have repeatedly cautioned that the existence of militias outside Government control is a fundamental anomaly that stands against the democratic aspirations of the Lebanese people and threatens domestic peace. Armed groups defying the control of the State are incompatible with the objective of strengthening Lebanon's sovereignty and political independence and with the protection of Lebanon's unique pluralistic system and the rights of Lebanese citizens. I condemn the use of illegal weapons wherever it occurs in Lebanon, in particular in populated areas. For that reason, I appeal to all parties, within and outside Lebanon, to immediately halt all efforts to transfer and acquire weapons and to build paramilitary capacities outside the authority of the State. All foreign financial and material support for Lebanon should be channelled transparently through the Government of Lebanon only.

44. With the collapse of the Government of National Unity in January, the issue of Hizbullah's weapons was again thrust into the spotlight of the political debate in Lebanon, with confessional overtones, but with implications for all Lebanese. Hizbullah's arsenal creates an atmosphere of intimidation and poses a key challenge to the safety of Lebanese civilians and to the Government's monopoly on the

legitimate use of force. I call upon the leaders of Hizbullah to complete without delay the group's transformation into a solely Lebanese political party and to disarm, consistent with the requirements set out in the Taif Accord and resolution 1559 (2004). In a democratic State, a political party cannot maintain its own militia. This is incompatible with Lebanon's high ideals of the protection of human rights.

45. As Hizbullah maintains close ties with regional States, I call upon all regional States to support and assist in the transformation of the armed group into a solely political party and its disarmament, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Accord and resolution 1559 (2004), in the best interest of regional peace and stability. This requirement has become even more urgent against the backdrop of the ongoing political upheavals across the region.

46. I remain convinced that the disarmament of armed groups in Lebanon, in particular Hizbullah, can best be achieved through a Lebanese-led political process, though this process cannot make headway until external actors cease their support for Hizbullah and the group itself accepts its responsibility to play by Lebanon's political rules. I regret that the primary internal mechanism for addressing this issue of fundamental importance to the Lebanese polity, the National Dialogue, has been unable to produce so far any tangible progress towards this goal.

47. I therefore call on Lebanese leaders to reconvene, under the auspices of President Sleiman, the National Dialogue. Lebanese leaders must work together to maintain stability, avoid hostile and incendiary rhetoric, and prevent the use of violence, in particular the resort to arms, in the domestic political arena. Lebanese leaders must also make progress towards adopting a national defence strategy that will address the issue of armed groups outside the control of the State and lead to their disarmament, to achieve the ultimate goal of putting all arms in Lebanon under the sole control of the Government.

48. In that context, I expect the next Government of Lebanon to adhere to resolution 1559 (2004) and all other Security Council resolutions pertaining to Lebanon. I welcome the positive statements of Prime Minister Designate Miqati, in which he expressed his commitment to Lebanon's international obligations. I also look forward to the next Government of Lebanon translating this commitment into tangible action, beginning with the implementation of decisions taken in the past by the National Dialogue, such as the dismantling of Palestinian military bases outside the refugee camps.

49. On that issue, there has been no progress. Paramilitary infrastructures outside the refugee camps belonging to the Damascus-headquartered PFLP-GC and Fatah Al-Intifadah continue to be of great concern to me. They remain beyond the authority of the Lebanese State, despite the decision taken by the National Dialogue in 2006 and reiterated several times since. The bases, most of which straddle the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, undermine Lebanese sovereignty and challenge the country's ability to manage its land borders. Mindful that the two militias maintain close regional ties, I renew my call upon the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to assist in this process.

50. In this regard, I note with regret that in the shadow of the current political crisis, there have been no further discussions or contacts between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic on the delineation of their common border, despite pledges by both leaders already in 2008 to address this issue. I urge Lebanon and the Syrian

Arab Republic to move forward without further delay on this issue, which has a critical impact on enhancing border control.

51. I call upon the next Government of Lebanon, when it is formed, to continue the efforts undertaken by former Prime Ministers Siniora and Hariri to help to alleviate the situation in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, which, I fear, is vulnerable to exploitation for political purposes. Conditions faced by Palestinian refugees in Lebanon remain dismal. I recall the commendable step taken in 2010 by Lebanon to ease restrictions on the access of refugees to the labour market. I also note, however, that more needs to be done to improve the living conditions of Palestinian refugees, without prejudice to an overall resolution of the Palestinian refugee questions within the framework of a comprehensive peace agreement. I am convinced that addressing the difficult conditions of Palestinian refugees will have a positive impact on the coexistence of Lebanese and Palestinians, and hence on national security and stability. I therefore call upon Lebanese and Palestinian authorities to continue their productive contacts, and upon Member States to offer whatever assistance may be required to continue the consolidation of political dialogue and security in the camps.

52. Recent security incidents highlight the need for Lebanese security forces to do more to prevent and respond to acts of violence, and for the Government of Lebanon and all relevant political leaders to make clear that such acts will not be tolerated. While the Lebanese security forces are careful not to inflame sectarian tensions by appearing to take sides, they clearly have a duty to enforce Lebanese law and to protect Lebanon's civilian population from harm. In that context, increased support for the Lebanese Armed Forces remains critical. They have continued to act with resolve, and their capacity had been gradually strengthened with the assistance of international donors. I am grateful to those countries that are helping to equip and train the Lebanese Armed Forces, and I urge the international community to continue this critically required support. This is essential to enable the Lebanese Armed Forces to assume effectively its responsibility under relevant Security Council resolutions.

53. I deplore the continued Israeli violations of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity. I call upon Israel to adhere to its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions and withdraw from the northern part of the village of Ghajar and cease its overflights of Lebanese airspace that raise tension, undermine the credibility of Lebanese security services, increase the risk of unintended conflict and generate anxiety among the civilian population.

54. In sum, the absence of a functioning Government in Lebanon for several months has created a power and security vacuum of which extremist and armed groups could take advantage, in an already fragile and polarized situation. I call upon the Government to be formed in Lebanon, a founding member of the United Nations, to commit to the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) and all other Security Council resolutions pertaining to Lebanon, and to take tangible measures towards their implementation. I am indeed deeply concerned that the combination of mistrust among the parties and the continued presence of militias could lead to tensions and possible insecurity and instability in Lebanon and beyond. It is therefore imperative that Lebanon preserve its comprehensive political framework of coexistence in mutual respect, as set out in the Taif Accord.

55. In the midst of momentous events in North Africa and the Middle East, the culture of intimidation by armed groups is, more than ever, unacceptable. The upheavals throughout the region will necessarily affect Lebanon. I urge all the friends and neighbours of Lebanon to play a constructive role in supporting the sovereignty and political independence of the country.

56. Against the backdrop of the upheavals across the region, the United Nations and Member States must remain firmly committed to the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) for the sake of regional peace and stability, in a particularly difficult and challenging time. I, therefore, call upon all parties and actors to fully abide by resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006). I will continue my efforts for the purpose of the full implementation of these and all other Security Council resolutions pertaining to Lebanon.

United Nations A/65/824–S/2011/260

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
20 April 2011

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session
Agenda item 97
General and complete disarmament

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Letter dated 19 April 2011 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the outcome Declaration of the Kyiv Summit on the Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy, held on 19 April 2011 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 97, as well as of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yevhenii **Tsymbaliuk**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

11-30607 (E) 260411

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 19 April 2011 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration by Heads of State and Government and representatives of participating States and organizations at the Kyiv Summit on the Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy

We, Heads of State and Government and representatives of participating States and organizations, have gathered in Kyiv on the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Chornobyl accident to reaffirm our commitment to work cooperatively in the area of nuclear safety, with the aim of strengthening our collective capabilities to prevent and mitigate the occurrence of such accidents in the future.

Earlier today, we discussed the outcome of international cooperative efforts, embracing the countries members of the Group of Eight as well as more than 20 other States, the European Union and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to decommission the Chornobyl nuclear plant and transform the damaged reactor site into an environmentally safe and secure condition. We demonstrated our will and ability to work together to bring resolution to nuclear incidents. The Chornobyl pledging conference raised 550 million euros. Some States wish to consider the amount of their contribution. These funds support completion of the final stages of work to render the damaged Unit 4 a site safe and to demonstrate our ability to collectively bring closure to this nuclear legacy.

Keeping in mind the lessons learned from the Chornobyl disaster, we are convinced that application of safety measures must continue to be a top priority in all activities related to nuclear energy use. The highest standards of nuclear safety are an indispensable prerequisite for the use of nuclear energy.

The unfolding events at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear plant remind us of the importance of strengthening nuclear safety and of responding promptly to nuclear accidents and emergencies, including those caused by large scale natural disasters. These events demonstrate that nuclear safety is enhanced when the global community works together to meet these challenges.

We strongly believe that cooperation and exchange of best practices in planning and building and in the operation of nuclear facilities will contribute to the enhancement of nuclear safety. In this connection, we urge all of the States that have not yet acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety to do so as soon as possible. We urge the nuclear energy industry and regulators in States with nuclear power plants to review existing power plants, in order to verify their capabilities to maintain safety, even in the face of severe adverse events.

We are committed to maintaining the highest levels of emergency preparedness and response capability to mitigate the effects of a nuclear accident. In addition, we strive to maintain, to the extent possible, transparency during such crises in order to keep the public informed as events transpire on the evolution of events.

Kyiv
19 April 2011

United Nations S/2011/261

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 April 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 20 April 2011 from the representatives of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

We have the honour to enclose herewith a statement issued by the Council of Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at the outcome of its 33rd extraordinary session, held on 17 April 2011, concerning the interference of the Iranian authorities in the internal affairs of GCC members States (see annex). It would be appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated among the members of the Security Council, and issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ambassador Ahmed **Al-Jarman**
Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Ambassador Nassir A. **Al-Nasser**
Permanent Representative of the State of Qatar to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Ambassador Tawfeeq **Almansoor**
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Ambassador Mansour A. **Alotaibi**
Permanent Representative of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Ambassador Lyutha S. **Al-Mughairy**
Permanent Representative of the Sultanate of Oman to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Mr. Omar A. **Al Oyaidi**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations

Annex to the letter dated 20 April 2011 from the representatives of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Statement by the Council of Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council

On 17 April 2011, the Council of Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) held its thirty-third extraordinary session. In the course of the session, the Council hailed the positive developments in the Kingdom of Bahrain since the declaration of the "state of national safety" and the positive measures that had been taken pursuant thereto, leading to the restoration of security, stability and tranquillity in the country.

The Council of Ministers also reiterated its rejection of the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the situation in Bahrain. The threats expressed in that letter reflect Iran's ongoing policy of interfering in the internal affairs of GCC member States, with a view to spreading allegations and lies, leading to unrest and instability in the region, in violation of international law and the principle of good neighbourliness between States.

The Council of Ministers called on the international community, notably the Security Council, as the supreme authority in the United Nations responsible for maintaining international security, to take the measures required to halt Iran's blatant interference, provocative actions and threats, the aim of which is to kindle strife in GCC member States, undermining their security and stability, despite the goodwill that had been demonstrated by those States.

Aware of their responsibilities and role in the region, and recalling their desire to maintain their sovereignty, stability and security, the GCC member States completely reject any external interference in their internal affairs, and will not hesitate to adopt any policies or take any necessary action in that regard. While desirous of maintaining good neighbourly relations with all States, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, the GCC member States nonetheless call on the Iranian regime to desist from acts of incitement or provocation, creating unrest, spreading lies, recruiting agents and establishing sleeper cells in GCC sovereign States. The purpose of those actions is to divert attention from the situation in Iran and its internal problems.

The Council of Ministers also deeply deplored the repeated aggressions committed against the premises of the diplomatic mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Iran. Those aggressions are a flagrant violation of international law and contrary to diplomatic norms. The Council of Ministers calls on the Iranian Government to ensure the protection and safety of diplomatic missions, in accordance with the relevant international instruments, and to hold the aggressors accountable.

Issued in Riyadh on 13 Jumada I A.H. 1432 (17 April A.D. 2011).

United Nations S/2011/263

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 April 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 19 April 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to attach hereto, a letter from Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed Al-Khalifa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain, addressed to Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations (see annex).

Kindly disseminate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Tawfeeq Ahmed **Almansoor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

11-31146 (E) 260411

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 19 April 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I know I share with you the firm belief that a secure and stable environment is an essential foundation for the inclusive, open and comprehensive process of national dialogue among all parts of society, which we in the Kingdom of Bahrain are convinced will provide the most effective means of discussing and addressing all issues in a manner acceptable to all.

The Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain is strongly committed to a political solution to the current situation, which, as you may be aware, has been significantly exacerbated by the active involvement of Hezbollah, a militia that operates freely in Lebanon, outside any Government control, in conducting terrorist activities in violation of several Security Council resolutions. In addition, some foreign countries have actively provided logistical support to Hezbollah to assist in destabilizing Bahrain over recent months. I enclose a detailed report outlining the interference by Hezbollah, which has taken many forms, including:

- Capitalizing on religious events outside Bahrain in order to meet with Bahraini facilitators to plan strategies and operations to destabilize Bahrain from within.
- Military training for Bahraini citizens in Hezbollah camps abroad.
- Executing terrorist acts in Bahrain using the same methods and tactics as Hezbollah.
- Inflammatory and inciting statements by Hezbollah leaders.

The Kingdom of Bahrain strongly condemns such interference in its internal affairs, and is working diligently to address this issue so that it can restore the stability and peace that Bahrain enjoys. I am hopeful that through such measures we can emerge even stronger, more unified and more prosperous.

I have no doubt that your clear and principled support demonstrates unequivocally the role of the United Nations in supporting the endeavours of Member States to uphold stability. I can assure you that the Government of Bahrain will continue to exert every effort to protect all its citizens and residents, while working tirelessly to ensure that the process of reform continues in order to meet the needs and aspirations of all Bahrainis. I look forward to continuing to work with you as we take these essential steps, and send you my sincere thanks, once again, for your important and unflinching support.

I would be grateful if you could circulate the present letter to the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed **Al-Khalifa**
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Kingdom of Bahrain

United Nations S/2011/264

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 April 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 22 April 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward a letter dated 22 April 2011 from Hor Namhong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Kingdom of Cambodia, addressed to you, regarding Thailand's aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia (see annex).

I would like to request that you kindly circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kosal Sea
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 22 April 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I would like to draw your kind attention to the fresh armed attacks by Thailand against Cambodia, as follows:

Today, 22 April 2011, at 6 a.m., Thailand started a large-scale attack with many types of weapons, including 105 millimetre (mm), 106 mm and 155 mm artillery, against Cambodia in the area of Ta Mone and Ta Krabey Temples located deep inside Cambodian territory. Thai artillery landed as far as 21 kilometres (km) inside Cambodia, at Kork Morn village in Uddar Meanchey Province, while there were violations by Thai airplanes deep within Cambodia's airspace. Cambodia suffered many casualties during this attack.

This fresh act of aggression violates not only all legal instruments as stated in my letter dated 5 February 2011 (S/2011/56) to the former President of the Security Council, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, but also the Council press statement of 14 February 2011 and the statement of the Chairman of Association of Southeast Asian Nations following the informal meeting held by ASEAN for Ministers for Foreign Affairs on 22 February 2011, calling for a permanent ceasefire.

May I recall that, to demonstrate its resentment over the inscription of Cambodia's Temple of Preah Vihear on the World Heritage List in July 2008, Thailand attacked Cambodia four times earlier, namely, on 15 July 2008, 15 October 2008, 3 April 2009 and 4-7 February 2011, during which cluster munitions were also used by Thailand, as confirmed by the Cluster Munitions Coalition on 6 April 2011.

This fresh military attack takes place in spite of intensive regional efforts by Indonesia, the Chair of ASEAN, supported by the Security Council, to establish a permanent ceasefire and a peaceful solution, after Thailand's large-scale offensive against Cambodia last February.

This deliberate act of aggression explains why Thailand has until now refused to accept the successive drafts of the terms of reference proposed by the Chair of ASEAN for the deployment of observers for Indonesia to monitor the commitment of both sides to averting further armed clashes, while Cambodia has already given its immediate positive response for the fourth time to the draft terms of reference after its revision so as to accommodate Thailand's position.

This most recent aggression against Cambodia also confirms the reason for Thailand's insistence on resolving the conflict "bilaterally", which is a pretext for using its larger and materially more sophisticated armed forces against Cambodia.

Cambodia has so far exercised maximum restraint and demonstrated its goodwill in order to maintain an atmosphere favourable to a peaceful settlement. However, it reserves the right to self-defence in the face of such deliberate acts of aggression.

Considering the repeated blatant acts of aggression by Thailand, I would highly appreciate it if you could circulate the present letter as a document of the Security Council to all members of the Council.

(*Signed*) **Hor** Namhong

United Nations S/2011/265

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 April 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 22 April 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand regarding the unprovoked armed attacks by Cambodian troops on Thai territory in the area of Ta Kwai temple and along the Thai-Cambodian border near Tamuen temples, in Surin Province, on 22 April 2011 (see annex).

I have the further honour to request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Norachit **Sinhaseni**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 22 April 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand regarding the unprovoked armed attacks by Cambodian troops at the Thai-Cambodian border on 22 April 2011

With regard to the unprovoked armed attacks on 22 April 2011 by Cambodian troops on Thai soldiers and civilians, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand wishes to state the following facts:

1. From 6.30 a.m. to 7 a.m. on 22 April 2011, Cambodian troops opened fire and launched heavy weapons, including mortars and artillery, without any provocation, into the area of Ta Kwai temple and along the Thai-Cambodian border towards Ta Muen temples, situated in Surin Province, Thailand. The Cambodian troops launched these attacks after a Thai Military Patrol Unit encountered armed Cambodian soldiers constructing bunkers in the area of Ta Kwai temple in Thai territory and informed the Cambodian side that such acts clearly violate Thai sovereignty.

2. At 8 a.m., a discussion was held by the commanders of both local forces during which a ceasefire was agreed. However, at 8.30 a.m., the Cambodian side restarted the firing of mortars and artillery into Thai territory, constituting a breach of the aforementioned agreement. The said exchange of fire lasted until 9.35 a.m.

3. These unprovoked armed attacks by Cambodian troops caused the death of at least three Thai soldiers and the injury of many soldiers, as well as the destruction of many civilian buildings and evacuation of nearly 10,000 civilians.

4. The Thai side has never opened fire first and has always exercised maximum restraint. However in light of Cambodia's action, Thailand was left with no choice but to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity by using proportionate means under international law.

5. Thailand protests in the strongest terms the unprovoked armed attacks of Cambodia on both Thai military and civilians, and the construction of the bunkers, which is a clear violation of international law, and the Charter of the United Nations, as well as of the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Thailand and the Government of Cambodia on the Survey and Demarcation of the Land Boundary, Thailand has exercised its inherent right of self-defence on the basis of necessity and proportionality and its response was directed strictly at the military targets from which the attacks were launched by Cambodian troops.

6. Thailand reaffirms its commitment to resolving any pending boundary issues peacefully and calls on Cambodia to resolve the dispute through the existing bilateral mechanisms, including the General Border Committee; the Regional Border Committee (a subcommittee of the General Border Committee); and the Thai-Cambodian Joint Commission on Demarcation of the Land Boundary. As a matter of fact, Thailand discussed the work on the survey and demarcation in the area around Ta Kwai temple with Cambodia during the meeting of the Joint Commission on Demarcation of the Land Boundary at Bogor City, Indonesia, on

7 and 8 April 2011. The record of the discussion of that meeting, which states that Thailand expressed its desire and readiness to commence survey work in Sector 5 (the area where Ta Kwai temple is located), demonstrates the sincerity of the Thai side in respect of resolving the boundary issues through peaceful means under the Joint Commission on Demarcation of the Land Boundary mechanism. In this regard, the Ministry of Defence of Thailand is in the process of consultation with its Cambodian counterpart, with a view to convening the General Border Committee and Regional Border Committee meetings as soon as possible.

United Nations S/2011/266

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 April 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 24 April 2011 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), I would like to draw your attention to paragraph 14 of Council resolution 1810 (2008), according to which the 1540 Committee "will submit to the Security Council a report no later than 24 April 2011 on compliance with resolution 1540 (2004) through the achievement of the implementation of its requirements".

I have the honour to inform you that the Committee is continuing its consideration of the report and, taking into account the consideration and adoption, on 20 April 2011, of Security Council resolution S/2011/1977 (2011) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to non-State actors, it will submit the report, which includes conclusions and recommendations, to the Council by 24 May 2011.

I would appreciate it if you could bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council and have it circulated as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Baso **Sangqu**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)

11-31081 (E) 260411

Please recycle

United Nations S/2011/267

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 April 2011

Original: English

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements concerning the situation in Sudan,

Considering the results of the referendum of Southern Sudan, announced on 7 February 2011 by the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, and *considering* the request by the Government of Southern Sudan for a continued United Nations presence in South Sudan,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend until 9 July 2011 the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) as set out in resolution 1590 (2005);

2. *Announces* its intent to establish a mission to succeed UNMIS;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to consult with the CPA parties in this regard and submit a report by 16 May;

4. *Authorizes* UNMIS to utilize its assets to prepare for the establishment of the above-mentioned successor mission;

5. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

11-31306 (E) 270411

Please recycle

United Nations S/2011/268

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 April 2011

Original: English

France, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling and *reaffirming* all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,

Reaffirming its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (2008), 1871 (2009) and 1920 (2010),

Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and *noting* the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,

Reiterating its call upon the parties and States of the region to cooperate more fully with the United Nations and with each other and to strengthen their involvement to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including MINURSO, under close review and reiterating the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Expressing serious concern about the increase in violations of existing agreements and *calling on* the parties to respect their relevant obligations,

Taking note of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-General and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also *taking note* of the Polisario Front proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary-General,

Inviting in this context the parties to demonstrate further political will towards a solution including by expanding upon their discussion of each other's proposals,

Taking note of the four rounds of negotiations held under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and the continued rounds of informal talks in Manhasset (United States), and Mellieha (Malta), and *welcoming* the progress made by the parties to enter into direct negotiations,

Welcoming the parties' agreement to explore innovative negotiating approaches and discrete subjects,

Stressing the importance of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps, and encouraging the parties to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect for human rights, bearing in mind their relevant obligations under international law,

Welcoming the establishment of a National Council on Human Rights in Morocco and the proposed component regarding Western Sahara, and the commitment of Morocco to ensure unqualified and unimpeded access to all Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council,

Also welcoming the implementation of the enhanced refugee protection program developed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in coordination with the Polisario Front, which will include human rights training and awareness initiatives,

Requesting UNHCR to maintain its consideration of a refugee registration in the Tindouf refugee camps,

Welcoming the agreement of the parties expressed in the Communiqué of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara of 18 March 2008 and looking forward to the inauguration of family visits by land and the continuation of the existing programme by air, and encouraging the parties to cooperate with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in implementing their agreement,

Welcoming the commitment of the parties to continue the process of negotiations through the United Nations-sponsored talks,

Recognizing that the consolidation of the status quo is not acceptable in the long term, and *noting further* that progress in the negotiations is essential in order to improve the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,

Affirming support for the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Ambassador Christopher Ross, and his work in facilitating negotiations between the parties also *welcoming* his ongoing consultations with the parties and neighbouring states,

Affirming support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO Hany Abdel-aziz,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 15 April 2011 (S/2011/249),

1. *Reaffirms* the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) with regard to the ceasefire and *calls* on the parties to adhere fully to those agreements;

2. *Calls on* all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of MINURSO and to ensure the security of as well as unhindered and immediate access for the United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, in conformity with existing agreements;

3. *Welcomes* the parties' commitment to continue the process of holding small, informal talks in preparation for a fifth round of negotiations, and recalls its endorsement of the recommendation in the report of 14 April 2008 (S/2008/251) that

realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to achieve progress in negotiations;

4. *Calls* upon the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (2008), 1871 (2009) and 1920 (2010) and the success of negotiations, inter alia, by devoting attention to the ideas in paragraph 120 of the Secretary-General's report (S/2011/249);

5. *Affirms* its strong support for the commitment of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy towards a solution to the question of Western Sahara in this context and welcomes the intensified pace of meetings and contacts;

6. *Calls* upon the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;

7. *Invites* Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on a regular basis, and at least twice a year, on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices and express its intention to meet to receive and discuss his report;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;

10. *Welcomes* the commitment of the parties and the neighbouring states to hold periodic meetings with the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees to review and, where possible, expand confidence-building measures;

11. *Urges* Member States to provide voluntary contributions to fund confidence-building measures that allow for increased contact between separated family members, especially family visits, as well as for other confidence-building measures that may be agreed upon between parties;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General in his next report to examine the existing challenges to MINURSO's operations, reflecting on the situation on the ground;

13. *Decides* to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 30 April 2012;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in MINURSO with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including predeployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

15. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2011/269

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 April 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 26 April 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 18 March 2011 (S/2011/149) notifying you of the intentions of the Government of the United Kingdom regarding measures pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011).

In accordance with paragraph 4 of that resolution, I wish to inform you of two further measures the United Kingdom is taking pursuant to the resolution. Firstly, it is supplying personal protective equipment to the Interim Transitional National Council. This will enable the recipients to more effectively protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya. It will also enable the civilian police to carry out their functions. Secondly, it is providing a small team of military advisers to mentor, and advise Interim Transitional National Council headquarters on how it might organize its internal structures, prioritize its resources and improve communications. This will increase the effectiveness of the headquarters and enable it to prioritize and react more quickly and appropriately so as to better protect civilians under threat.

I would be grateful if you could circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mark Lyall Grant

11-31239 (E) 270411

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United Nations S/2011/270

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 April 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 26 April 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) and to my letter of 19 March 2011 (S/2011/158), and to provide you with the following information.

In accordance with paragraph 4 of that resolution, I wish to inform you of two further measures Italy is taking pursuant to the resolution. Firstly, it is supplying personal protective equipment to the Interim Transitional National Council. This will enable the recipients to more effectively protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya. It will also enable the civilian police to carry out their functions. Secondly, it is providing a small team of military advisers to mentor and advise the Interim Transitional National Council headquarters on how it might organize its internal structures, prioritize its resources and improve communications. This will increase the effectiveness of the headquarters and enable it to prioritize and react more quickly and appropriately so as to better protect civilians under threat.

I would be grateful if you could circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Cesare Maria **Ragaglini**

11-31233 (E) 270411

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